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· TOPIC IV.B.2
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA
Reflections on American Constitutionalism
Understanding American constitutionalism can be advanced by
distinguishing three matrices of its peculiar traits. The first is the
character of political institutions whose roots lie deeply inpre-mod-
ern forms of authority. The pivotal role of the Constitution in the
life of the nation, the vital energies of judicial review, and many
other hallmarks of American constitutionalism are all related to this
first source. The second matrix is the distinctive position of the con-
stitutive docum.ent in a culture of predominantly judge-made law.
Authoritative t~~xts and judicial decisions vie for pride of place, and
explain why so many issues of constitutional law elude conventional
classificatory schemes. The third matrix is the need to adapt late
eighteenth-century arrangements reflected in the Constitution to al-
tered social needs and understandings. Many intense controversies
in contemporary constitutional discourse are related to methods of
this aggiornamento.
I shall organize my report around these three matrices, devoting
to each a separute section, and try to demonstrate how they illumi-
nate distinctive aspects of American constitutionalism. Before I
close, I shall then discuss some challenges to American constitution-
alism in our times. Foremost in my mind here will be the problem
of adjusting an apparatus devised to contain the government to a
time when decisive action is sometimes expected from the State.
I. IMPACT OF AUTHORITY STRUCTURE
Despite the creativity of its Framers, the Constitution of 1789
did not break the continuity with politicul arrangements the colo-
nists transferred to the New World from England early in the 17th
century. An aspect of this tradition with which the colonists were
most familiar was strong local self-government, including the partic-
ipation of the local elite in the administration of justice. The Fram-
ers took this aspect of governance, widely regarded as a matter of
natural right, for granted, and left the lowest tier of government un-
regulated. But even their design of central government was in many
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ways an echo of Tudor England, characterized by a rough balance of
power between three competing power centers, the monarch, the
nobility and the burghers, and teeming with all-purpose officials ex-
ercising inherent authority. The three branches of American gov-
ernment, despite labels suggestive of functional specialization,
retained a sufficient measure of fused powers to enable each branch
to become an independent power center, checking and balancing one
another. Federal-state relations only added to the fragmentation of
relatively undifferentiated powers typical of Tudor government, and
inherent authority continued to be invoked in America as it was in
Tudor times.
Most significant for my purposes was another lineage of ancient
English political arrangements. In Tudor England it was difficult to
identify a single source of all authority; notions of unitary sover-
eignty remained undeveloped. In this situation the ultimate mea-
sure of all legitimate authority was placed in God and the
Fundamental Law, with the result that all governmental activity ap-
peared adjudicative, that is, ultimately representing an application of
the vague fundamental law. In a similar constellation of coordinate
branches of American government, the sovereignty was placed in
the People and their Charter, with the same potential for intermin-
gling political and legal realms and making the Constitution central
to most matters in the life of the polity.l Practically, ultimate au-
thority came to reside in a process of accommodation among com-
peting power centers, rather that in a readily identifiable entity.
This continuity presents an important contrast to most Euro-
pean countries, where the rise of bureaucratic absolutism all but de-
stroyed the traces of old constitutionalism.2 The more unified but
functionally more specialized apparatus of governance that emerged,
and the idea that power flows from the top downwards, provided
starting points for the growth of mqdern European constitutional-
ism. In America, by contrast, constitutionalism grew in an environ-
ment of widely distributed but less differentiated powers, and was
sustained by an idea of power flowing du bas en haut.
The tradition of widely distributed but relatively undifferenti-
ated powers is clearly visible in all branches of the American gov-
ernment. Congress, for example, shares in the executive function in
1. On the survival of medieval constitutionalism in Tudor England, see S. B.
Chrimes, English Constitutional History 121·23, (2nd ed. 1953). For the influence of
Tudor political traditions on the colonists, see C. H. McIlwain, The High Court of
Parliament and Its Supremacy (1910). The reasons why England broke with the
medieval constitution are discussed in S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies 103·04 (1968).
2. See B. M. Downing, "Constitutionalism, Warfare and Political Change in
Early Modern Europe", 17 Theory and Society, 7·51 (1988),
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several important ways, some of which imply micro-management.
In its legislative capacity3 it must cope with considerable internal
fragmentation of power that exceeds even the division of the legisla-
tive branch into two working bodies: important authority is also ex-
ercised within. each body by numerous committees and sub-
committees, even their chairpersons. Strongly localist notions of rep-
resentation make each individual member of Congress extremely
- sensitive to his or her constituency and capable of resisting party
discipline or other forces counteracting wide distribution of indepen-
dently exercised power. If a bill clears all these internal hurdles,
and is not vetoed by the President, it is likely to be strewn with
compromises and ambiguities.4 The resulting absence of clarity, co-
herence and attention to the long-range view decreases the impor-
tance of the legislature as a jurisgenerative organ; many important
questions of so(~ial policy must be framed and resolved elsewhere.
Consider now the impact of the wide distribution of blended
functions on the guardians of the Constitution - the judges. What
makes them so powerful in policing compliance with constitutional
mandates is thEl concentration of responsibilities in their hands that
vastly exceed narrow adjudicative functions. Their law-making pow-
ers are exemplified not only by the fact that judicial precedent is a
source of legal standards, but also by the fact that they possess a de-
gree of rule-making competence in procedural and evidentiary mat-
ters. In the remedial and enforcement phases of a lawsuit, they also
exercise broad and essentially self-defined powers of an administra-
tive and managerial character. Thus, in enforcing their decisions,
they are entitled to issue orders to officials in other branches of gov-
ernment, backing these orders by a threat to jailor fine th9se who
disobey until ihey comply. Appellate courts review these orders
only to a very limited degree. This "contempt of court" power is
considered to inhere in judicial offices, so that it does not require
any statutory basis. It still shows faint memories of Angevin all-pur-
pose officials, and it predates Montesqui(~uanmisgivings about ac-
cording to the same individuals the power to pronounce the law and
the power to enforce it.5
3. Legislative activity of the Congress is not always understood in the strict
sense, i.e., as creation of general norms. For example, individual bills are by no
means a rarity. Also, when Congress delegates legislative powers, it sometimes re-
views administrative regulations emanating from such delegation against the back-
ground of their application to individual cases, lmgaging thus in quasi-judicial
activity.
4. On linkages of American practices of representation to sixteenth-century
England and their different development in England in the seventeenth century, see
Huntington, op.cit. supra n. 1, pp. 106-08. How the British political system enables
easier and more uJlcompromising legislation is discussed in D.S. Atyah and R.S.
Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law 302·06 (1987).
5. Some Framers, including Madison, apparently shared Montesquieu's misgiv-
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This concentrated power is decentralized to a comparatively re-
markable degree. Even the power to decide constitutional chal-
lenges is not reserved for a highly placed tribunal, but is distributed
throughout the judicial apparatus including the trial courts. And be-
cause Americans do not share the traditional continental suspicion
of individual decisionmaking (juge unique juge inique), judicial re-
view of constitutionality is exercised in the first instance by individ-
ual trial judges. This wide diffusion of authority is reinforced by the
tradition of making the fundamental law the measure of all legiti-
mate exercise of power: the power to adjudicate without the possibil-
ity to consider the fundamental law would seem deficient in its vital
dimension. Nor should one imagine that American trial judges, es-
pecially in the federal system, shy away from deciding matters of
great political importance implicated in constitutional questions; be-
ing people in their second career, relatively unconcerned about pro-
motions, they make use of these powers in a comparatively bold
manner.
The radical decentralization of judicial review of constitutional-
ity and the implicit absence of specialization have had a profound in-
fluence on the more recent role of the United States Supreme
Court. Early in this century, this Court was still but an ordinary tri-
bunal of last resort, offered the usual menu of constitutional and
non-constitutional cases generated in the courts below. As the cen-
tury progressed, however, the Court began employing various tech-
niques at its disposal to curb the (now defunct) mandatory appellate
review of routine cases and concentrate on constitutional cases of its
own choice.6 This fact should not cause one, however, to overlook
the difference that exists between the American system and others
with a specialized constitutional court. To begin with, American ju-
dicial review continues to be decentralized; trial judges decide con-
stitutional cases in the first instance, and not all of these cases find
their way to the Supreme Court. It is by no means rare that the
Court will refuse for a long time to decide an issue, even in those
instances where intermediate appellate courts in the federal system
diverge in their constitutional pronouncements. But there is also a
ings. See, e.g., Madison, The Federalist, No. 47, 324, 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). As they
failed to define judicial powers, however, constitutional limitations on the adminis-
trative component of the judicial office are uncertain to the present day. See, e.g.,
R.F. Nagel, "Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies" 30
Stan.L.Rev. 66 (1978). It is only in its 1989 Fall Term that the U.S. Supreme Court
chose to consider two cases which raise the issue of constitutional limits on the pow-
ers of the federal judiciary to coerce action from officials.
6. Note that Continental countries are traditionally hostile to giving higher
courts the power to select appeals they will decide. The West German Constitu-
tional Court has even branded this power as unconstitutional. See the Decisions of
Jan. 16, 1979 [in 1979 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 151,533] and the decision of
June 11, 1980 BVerfGE 54,277.
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significant difference in the sense in which the Supreme Court "spe-
cializes" in constitutional matters. Since it is the tribunal of last re-
sort on all matters, constitutional vel non, the Court has the power
to decide cases on the merits, and is thus not limited to decide the
"abstracted" constitutional issue as is the rule in those systems that
entrust the resolution of constitutional questions to a special court.
There being no strict specialization in deciding constitutional
matters, there are also no special constitutional actions; the vehicle
for raising and resolving constitutional issues is ordinary litigation,
of which various types of injunctions are probably in recent times of
greatest practical significance. Injunctive decrees in which they re-
sult, backed by contempt powers, may require defendants to do spec-
ified things (cogere ad actum proprium), and can be quite effective
in constitutional litigation. Taking as an example the exercise of ju-
dicial power for a generally approved cause, imagine parents of a
black child trying to have her admitted to a school with a record of
racial discrimination. If they request inj1.IDctive relief, alleging the
impending danger of a violation of the constitutional equal protec-
tion clause, the judge can order the officials to admit the child, and
monitor compliance with the decree by thE~ threat of finding them in
contempt of court. As we shall see in the last section, when such in-
junctions are combined with so-called class-actions, they carry great
potential for converting trial judges into institutional and social re-
formers who mold reality into conformity with specific visions of
constitutional d«~mands.
Stemming not only from decentralization and fusion of powers,
but also from low institutionalization characteristic of pre-bureau-
cratic forms of authority, is the peculiarly personalized manner in
which American judges perform their tasks, including judicial re-
view of constitutionality. Judicial decisionrnaking is as much expres-
sion of a person as it is of an office. This can be observed even at the
very top of the judicial hierarchy: justices of the Supreme Court sel-
dom choose the anonymity of per curiam opinions. At least in more
recent times, th«~y are comparatively unrestrained in delivering dis-
senting and concurring opinions, so that even where a majority is
obtained in support of a particular result, the import and signifi-
cance of the decision can remain ambiguous.7
The radical decentralization of constitutional control has subtle
but important implications for American judges' gen,eral attitudes
7. Since the 1960s, the number of U.S. Supreme Court rulings in which no ma-
jority emerged for any decisional ground (plurality opinions) has greatly increased.
See Note, "Plurality Decisions" 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1127 (1980). The incidence of dissents
is also on the increase. See "The Supreme Court, 1980 Term" 95 Harv.L.Rev. 441
(1981). For comparisons with Britain, see Atyah and Summers, supra n. 3, pp. 283-
89.
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toward the law. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that all law
below the constitutional level binds the judges only conditionally
until it is subject to constitutional scrutiny.s As this scrutiny neces-
sarily requires involvement with broad political, ethical and other
substantive considerations, sensitivity toward these issues permeates
the whole judicial system, increasing the readiness of judges to go
behind the verbal expression of the law, and thus decreasing the rel-
ative weight of formal arguments. Coupled with an autonomous ju-
dicial self-image, radical decentralization creates habits of listening
to many voices in the law, and a remarkable tolerance of indetermi-
nacy and instability in the legal system. Accordingly, even in the
constitutional area, foreigners should be prepared to find an abun-
dance of questions with several authoritative answers. And what to
them may seem a confusing state of affairs, too baroque in its chiaro-
scuro and its repudiation of forces of gravity, seems domestically an
acceptable price for an institutional arrangement of widely distrib-
uted authority.
II. THE COMMON-LAW LEGACY
The Framers imagined the Constitution as an authoritative text
similar to a colonial charter. Also influential was the Enlighten-
ment ideal of law as a textually fixed norm; all major schools of
thought that influenced the Framers adhered to the ideal of legisla-
tive enactments as the highest form of law.9 But the legal tradition
in which the Constitution came to be immersed refused to share this
ideal; here true law-givers were judges, who discovered the true
meaning of spoken and written normative sources generated by
competing power centers. The core of law in this tradition was not
textually settled and was associated with litigation. Since law con-
ceived as a canonical text and law associated with court decisions
cannot be placed side-by-side without creating friction, a source of
inner tension was present in American constitutionalism from its
beginning. And because proper understanding of this constitutional-
ism, particularly on the part of those coming from less litigation-cen-
tered legal cultures, requires attention to the common law
component in the mix, I must quickly review some vivid symptoms
of the common law heritage.
It is true that when courts police the constitution, its text inevi-
tably becomes covered by judicial gloss. But the degree to which the
8. Compare this to the image of the traditional continental judge subordinated
to the statute. As Abbe de Mably exclaimed at the time when this image was
shaped, "All is lost if the judge wants to be smarter than the statute". See H. Drost,
Das Ermessen des Stra/richters 88 (1930).
9. See G. Wills, Explaining America 121,132 (1981).
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gloss submergE~s the text varies, depending on the manner in which
court decisions are treated. There is a technique that is easily recon-
cilable with textualism; decisions referring to a text are detached
from factual contexts and converted into abstract norms that fill
conceptual vessels of the governing text with more specific content.
Here the judicial gloss is translucent; as the gloss thickens the text
may even become clearer. American case-law, however, is of a dif-
ferent nature: fact and law .remain more closely intertwined, and
precedent becomes a story from which ordering thought cannot eas-
ily derive clear rules. Decisions "applying" a .text are compared to
one another, rather than fitted into the scheme of the text as its
concretization. Assuming thus a life of its own, this variety of case-
law makes the judicial gloss over any enactment (including the Con-
stitution) opaque, tending to submerge it and reduce its significance.
Nor does constitutional scholarship prevent this submersion by exer-
cising a sort of weed control, pruning out some decisions as redun-
dant or aberrational and trying to weave the reminder into the
scheme of the text. IO As a consequence, constitutional law in
America tends to be equated with constitutional adjudication that
follows its own. inner dynamics.
Among numerous implications of this development, let me sin-
gle out for spec~ial consideration its impact on constitutional creativ-
ity, a matter that is so important for the flavor of constitutionalism.
Imbued by Enlightenment theories, the F'ramers contemplated their
text to be alterable by way of contrarius cu:tus, that is, by way of fol-
lowing amendment procedures laid down in Article Five, procedures
which, they thought, could take the pulse of the People. But as the
Constitution came to be covered by the moss of accumulated judicial
gloss, changing the latter became tantamount to changing the under-
lying text - always, of course, under the pretext of merely acting
within textual parameters, merely interpreting the Founding text.
Very demanding amendment procedures .thus acquired a serious
competitor in highly flexible judicial techniques of changing consti-
10. Neither does American constitutional scholarship regard it as its important
task to try to interpret the text of the Constitution in terms of imagined future
cases. The main seholarly effort goes into providing arguments for one or another
side after an actual controversy arises, with the consequence that there is usually
very little scholarly authority in advance of an actual controversy. (Of course, be-
cause scholars seldom commit themselves to a position under the veil of ignorance,
the fruits of their efforts have relatively weak claims to neutrality). No wonder that
even constitutional questions of potentially great significance receive little scholarly
attention unless they arise in the context of a real-life problem. For example, there
is at present little scholarly discussion of a variety of issues connected with poten-
tially very important processes of formal constitutional amendment (e.g., how does
Congress ·convene a Constitutional convention, what voting rules should apply there,
does the President play the presentment role, and so on).
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tutional case-Iaw.ll Observe that a doctrine established by case-law
can openly be discarded if it appears wrong in light of substantive
arguments, but it can also be transformed by more covert tech-
niques. Since American precedents are enmeshed in constellations
of facts, constitutional "doctrines" can almost imperceptibly be ex-
panded, or, slowly nibbled away until they shade into insignificance.
The flexibility of case-law has allowed the American constitutional
system to absorb dramatic changes, such as the departure from
strong laissez-faire positions - changes which would in more formal
and textually centered systems have required a new Founding in-
strument, perhaps even a revolution. However, the same flexibility
means that only in a very limited sense can the American Constitu-
tion nowadays be classified as "rigid", i.e., as containing arrange-
ments that are strongly entrenched and difficult to alter.
Symptomatic of the reduced significance of the constitutional
text is also the absence of pressures, present in many other systems,
to incorporate into it matters of such fundamental importance to the
governance of the Nation that they would merit insulation from or-
dinary politics. Consider, for example, that the Constitution was not
amended to "entrench" the direct election of the President, the le-
gitimacy of regulatory agencies, or, ironically, the very power of fed-
eral judges to invalidate congressional enactments. To the extent
that some of these matters (omitted from the Constitution) are mat-
ters of standing practice, the difference vis a vis the unwritten Brit-
ish Constitution is on this score not as dramatic as might appear at
first sight.
The common-law heritage is also clearly visible in the method
of raising constitutional challenges. A constitutional issue cannot be
placed before the courts in abst~to, by alleging, on the basis of
mere textual comparison, that a lower norm violates the Constitu-
tion. Instead, an actual litigational impulse is required, and the con-
stitutional question is decided in the context of a "case or
controversy" (Art.3, sec.2). Until quite recently this requirement
was taken quite seriously, so that one wishing to test the constitu-
tionality of a law would sometimes have actually to break it, to cre-
ate a litigation in the course of which the constitutional question
could incidentally be decided. It is now easier to seek an anticipa-
tory (declaratory) judgment that a law is unconstitutional, and this
demand can be coupled with a request that the use of the law in
question be prohibited. Yet, a concrete stake in the case must still
be shown by the plaintiff (e.g., an impending plan to violate the
11. It is interesting to note in this connection that one-fourth of all amendments
that have been adopted since the Bill of Rights were framed not really to change the
text but to overturn specific Supreme Court decisions. See F. McDonald, "Cleaning
up the Justices' Messes", The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1989, p. A-10.
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law).12 It is also true, as we shall see in the next section, that the
case and controversy requirement was relaxed in certain types of ac-
tion brought in the public interest. Nevertheless, even at the zenith
of this novel breed of litigation, the constitutional question contin-
ued to present itself for resolution in a particularized factual setting,
linked to individual destinies. Nor have various technical implica-
tions of the litigational approach, such as ripeness of the dispute, or
standing, been made completely ethereal; they always remained
available to the court to refuse to consider a matter as too abstract
or speculative.13
Case-law influences and a depreciation of textualism can be ob-
served in prevailing forms of invalidation of enactments. Only in
limited areas is a type of invalidation frequently encountered that
could be imagined as a declaration of textual incompatibility of an
enactment and the Constitution. But even this so-called "facial" in-
firmity lies more in the incompatibility of underlying policies than
in textual dissonances. Much more common is an invalidation of en-
actments as "applied" (or interpreted) in a specific litigational con-
text, and here the court's pronouncement is immediately enveloped
by the concrete circumstances of the case.
The effect of the decision beyond the parties to constitutional
litigation is linked to the stare decisis doctrine, and therefore
changes with the rank of the court in question. But even if the
curse of unconstitutionality is declared by the U.S. Supreme Court,
so that the practical effect of the decision is erga omnes, it is no
more than a directive addressed to the courts below to refuse to en-
force the condemned enactment unless and until the Court decides
to change its mind. Assuming that the Court does change its mind,
it is uncertain whether the once invalidated statute needs now to be
re-enacted. Perhaps it was never really dead, only comatose? The
resulting absence of a clear-cut answer, or its "in-betweeness," is
characteristic of law arising out of the litigational context. Associ-
ated with the centrality of judge-made law is also the difficulty in
the American constitutional system of envisioning a constitutional
right as an abstract aspiration: a right without an enforceable claim
to remedy in case of violation seems grotesquely deformed to the ju-
12. See, e.g., United Public Workers ofAmerica, v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). There is no possibility in the federal system
to frame an abstract question pertaining to the constitutionality of a bill or contem-
plated statute and submitting it to a court for resolution, since the federal courts re-
fuse to issue advisory opinions. It should be noted, however, that federal courts
sometimes ask for advisory opinions from state supreme courts.
13. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to take subdoctrines of
"case or controversy" again more seriously. See generally R. Fallon, "On Jus-
ticiability" 59 N. Y. U.L.Rev. 1-75 (1984).
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dicial mind.14 It may thus be harder in America than elsewhere to
proclaim certain sonorous constitutional rights without a directly en-
forceable content, rights one often encounters in some foreign con-
stitutional systems: it can be expected in America that the
recognition of such rights (aspirations) will soon lead to litigation in
the course of which judges will be tempted to fashion some sort of
remedy.
Constitutional systems often embrace an elaborate hierarchy of
legal sources that establishes a rigid protocol of precedence: norms
of lower rank cede before their superiors in case of conflict; the va-
lidity of each lower norm depends on a grant of authority from the
superior jurisgenerative agency. The vision underlying this ranking
scheme is one of Rechtsordnung in which all general rules originate
from a high source and cascade downwards over levels of normative
hierarchy. Where this vision is strong, as it still is in several Euro-
pean countries, judicial review of constitutionality tends to center on
the constitutionality of statutes (i.e. legislation); invalidation of
lower enactments typically entails a finding of their incompatibility
with a statute, and the constitutionality question need not be
reached.
The American syste~ is again sui generis, as can be expected in
a setting of loosely hierarchical power centers, and in a legal culture
where judicial decisions compete for primacy with enactments. It is
not that rules of precedence do not exist. In fact, the basic distinc-
tion between the constitutional level and the rest of law is more fre-
quently and vigorously enforced here than in other countries. The
"supremacy clause" (Art.G, sec.2) establishing the precedence of fed-
eral over state law is entrenched in the constitutional text, and the
principle that state law pre-empts local law is proclaimed in state
constitutions. However, the ranking of authorities below the consti-
tutional level is riddled with ambiguities and eludes expression in
coherent general formulae. In addition, the objects of constitutional
challenge need not be enactments at all, let alone statutes.
Where lines are blurred between the constitution and judge-
made constitutional law, and where each individual judge can find a
statute unconstitutional, judicial decisions take precedence over leg-
islation in a variety of important senses. The practice is not uncom-
mon in America for Bench and Bar to cite a statute through
references to it in cases, as if the former needed pedigree support
rather than the latter. In contrast to countries where judicial deci-
sions are not a formal source of law, American judges generate
norms even in those areas that are not covered by legislation, so that
there may be a direct conflict between principles stemming from ju-
14. See, e.g., P.Shuck, Suing the Government 26 (1983).
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dicial decisions and the Constitution. For a variety of reasons, this
conflict between "common law" and the Constitution is by no means
settled.1s Curious to report also is the possibility of conflict between
legislative and judicial lawmaking due to inherent powers of many
state supreme courts to enact rules and to openly legislate in areas
such as the law of evidence. The possibility thus arises of a statute,
passed by the state legislature, being challenged as an unconstitu-
tional intrusion in the jurisgenerative sphere of the court.16
An enactment of local government can also become an object of
direct constitutional attack more easily in this system than in ~any
others. As suggested before, local autonomy has deep roots in
America, and local law does not require specific grants of authority
from state gOVE!rnment,17 Quite often, then, a municipal ordinance
cannot be traced even to umbrella-like state authorization, and its
content can dE!al with matters which people under other skies
would believe required uniform solutions throughout the state. As a
result of this frequent attack on local enactments, questions of con-
stitutionality and "legality" cannot as easily be teased apart as in
systems with a more rigid hierarchy of formal legal sources.
What is the principal lesson to be drawn from this cursory ex-
ploration of various common-law influences on· American constitu-
tionalism? Unlike the situation in countries where the litigational
context is less central to the law, constitutional problems can seldom
be discussed grosso modo and detached from sometimes Lilliputian
details of factual situations. Constitutional law defies abridgement
in terms of a body of interrelated legal standards, and the constitu-
15. Part of the reason are ambiguities of the so-called "state action" doctrine.
See L. Tribe, Constitutional Law 1711-15 (2d ed., 1988). Observe also that American
judges can often shape conditions of probation without any statutory support, so that
a decision on this subject cannot be challenged as contrary to statute but only as con-
trary to the Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d, 1128 (1984).
16. Recently the Supreme Court of Mississippi invalidated an enactment of the
state legislature as unconstitutionally encroaching on the court's inherent powers to
promulgate "rules of practice." See Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338(1989).
17. A wide sphElre of local autonomy was considered in colonial America to be a
matter of inherent right. This belief remained essentially unchanged until about
1850, when the view prevailed that cities and other units of local government only
exercise powers delegated to them by the state. See H. Mc Bain, The Law and Prac-
tice of Municipal Home Rule 5-6 (1916). Yet, in many states, successful attempts
were made to preserve a limited number of matters (such as the provision of trans-
portation or education services) for cities. See C.J. Antieau, Municipal Corporation
Law, Vol.1, Chapt.2 (1989). Even more importantly for my purposes, state legislation
remained quite fragmentary, leaving considerable room for local norm-creation
outside the private law area. For a good survey of cases showing the continuing im-
portance of mUnicipal ordinances in the total nonnative output, see M. Libonati,
"Reconstructing Local Government" 19 The Urban Lawyer, 645 (1987). A good ex-
ample of litigation in the area is the pending lawsuit of the Justice Department
against the city of Oakland, Calif., which passed a law prohibiting the production,
storage or transport of nuclear weapons. Justice claims that this law unconstitution-
ally interferes with the government's power to conduct foreign policy.
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tional text, apart from its application to actual controversies, hardly
seems worthy of attention. In a system of judge-made law there is,
like jazz improvisation, no score in advance of the performing act.
III. THE RISE OF ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT
Unlike their French contemporaries, the Framers contemplated
no change in social relationships through the use of governmental
power. Because of their belief that society could best develop with
minimal state interference, (except, perhaps, to support a market
economy), the Constitution is devoid of programmatic provisions
designed to guide legislative and other state action; few and far be-
tween are substantive provisions, such as the contract clause. The
constitutional debate in Philadelphia focused on the organization of
federal government and its relation to the states. It was concerned
with organic matters, and was process-oriented. The structure of
government that emerged from the adaptation of traditional institu-
tions fitted the Framers' conception about governmental functions:
where government has few tasks to perform in society, and may
even be a hostile force, fracturing and weakening power may be an
alluring animating principle of governmental organization. Funda-
mental rights added to the Constitution in 1791 reflected the same
political outlook. Citizens were envisaged as possible targets of ag-
gressive governmental action, and rights understood as a protection
from such action. Note, quite in parenthesis, that these rights only
legitimated the traditional substance of rights exercised by colonists
before the Revolution.18
In this larger context, the power of the judiciary to police the
Constitution could be understood as an additional check on the gov-
ernment to remain within its charter, and thus easily reconciled
with the philosophy of containing the powers of the state. Where ju-
dicial review was exercised, - and it happened infrequently, at least
with respect to congressional enactments, until about 1870, - it dealt
mostly with the framework of political institutions.19 The prevailing
18. Consider the contrast between late 18th century Paris and Philadelphia. The
makers of the French Constitution were fashioning a nouveau regime, complete
with a new inventory of rights. To achieve these objectives, they desired a strong
and centralized government, rather than one saddled with Montesquieuan jreins et
contre-poids. No wonder then that some prominent French politicians castigated the
American Framers for their choice of weak government. For a polemic with French
critics of checks and balances, see J. Adams, A Defense oj the American Constitu-
tion, in The Political Writings ojJohn Adams 122-25 (1954).
19. The anti-slavery provisions of the 13th Amendment, enacted after the Civil
War, were an exception to the general position that the Constitution is but a shield
against state action and does not have broader effects. But the constitutional amend-
ment was used here to create a nouveau regime in the South, so that the objective of
constitution-makers was in this instance closer to .that of French Founding Fathers
of 1791 than to the Framers of the original Philadelphia document. It is thus
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mode of review was prohibitory. A law or measure would be found
ultra vires, as it were, and other branches of government would thus
be left with considerable freedom to choose alternative ways of pur-
suing their objectives. It is only with the emergence of welfare legis-
lation at the turn of the century that judicial review, especially of
congressional enactments, became more frequent. It also began to
change its character: judges came to discover substantive content in
the husk of constitutional provisions, first to protect laissez-faire,
and later to support state intervention in economic and social life.
This discovery gradually transformed judicial review from an exer-
cise of mainly prohibitory powers into an exercise of a curious mix
of prohibitory and policy-shaping powers. With that transformation
we are fully in the modern constitutional current.
It is interesting to look at this modern compound of prohibitory
and shaping powers from the vantage point of those states which
have self-consciously designed a constitutional system for a modern
welfare government. In this perspective, the compound appears as a
set of epicycles for the conversion of a constitutional scheme
designed to contain the government into one that generates support
for fragmentary and hesitant governmental intervention in society.
To present this perspective, a brief digression is in order.
The modern welfare state rests on the assumption that self-reg-
ulating social mechanisms cannot assure desired levels of social har-
mony without substantial governmental interference. Welfare state
constitutions therefore contain many programmatic provisions spell-
ing out guidelines for the content of state legislation and other gov-
ernmental actions. Because rights guaranteed by the constitution
are inspired not only by the image of citizens as victims but also by
their image as beneficiaries of state activity, classical defensive
rights are supplemented by so-called "social rights," such as the
right to education or to a minimum level of material well-being.20
These new rights tend to relativize the old because the optimal allo-
cation of rights to constrain the state is not necessarily optimal for
the realization of programs designed to produce benefits to which so-
cial rights refer. As the welfare state constitution becomes a policy-
shaping instrument, its provisions place positive demands on govern-
scarcely surprising that some scholars have' detected in the 13th Amendment ele-
ments of welfare state constitutionalism avant la lettre. See A.R. Amar "Philadel-
phia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V" 55 U.Chi.L.Rev, 1043,
1045 n.(1988).
20. Not all of these social righ~ are rights in the usual sense of enforceable sub-
jective entitlements. For example, provisions creating such "rights" are sometimes
addressed to the government, urging it to create conditions conducive to the actual
enjoyment of such rights. For an excellent discussion see R. Alexy, Theorie der
Grundrechte 454-58 (1985). See also M. DamaSka, The Faces ofJustice and State Au-
thority 83-84 (1986).
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ment and even on individuals. This broader "radiation" of the con-
stitution is openly recognized and self-consciously regulated, so that
new constitutional doctrines appear, replacing the old ones focusing
on state action as the virtually exclusive concern of constitutional
contro1,21
An important new feature of judicial review is that judges
in the welfare state can now easily find constitutional support for
demanding the institution of social programs or the launching of
specific affirmative actions by the government. Worthy of note also
is the fact that protection of particular substantive values now
enshrined in the constitution may require that particular conduct
heretofore permitted be made criminal. Where prohibitory constitu-
tionalism only required decriminalization, the new one may brand
decriminalization as unconstitutional. (Note that the West German
and Spanish Constitutional Courts found the decriminalization of
abortion unconstitutional). Whether or not welfare state judges de-
mand positive action from other branches of government depends
not only on various political considerations (too complex to be con-
sidered here), but also on the degree to which the executive and the
legislative branches initiate constitutionally required positive action
sua sponte. Observe, however, that this transcendence by the judici-
ary of mere negative powers may cause legitimacy problems. Judi-
cial review can now more seriously interfere with the freedom of
other branches of government. No longer can judges merely limit
the choice-set of other branches, they can now demand from them
that they make a specific decision, thus totally displacing their judg-
ment. And a program found constitutionally mandated may be cost-
intensive, for example, straining the budget for which more repre-
sentative governmental agencies are responsible. (Citizens dislike to
be taxed without representation). More generally, review of consti-
tutionality may now be suspect as a manifestation of too much em-
phasis on creating obstacles to governmental action. L 'homme a
programme sees little virtue in dilatoriness; checks and balances, of
which judicial review is but an example, may seem to him as a unde-
sirable paralytic device, unsuitable to changed political
circumstances.
Contemporary America remains deeply ambivalent about the
use of governmental power in social and economic life, and the role
21. Typical is the German doctrine of Drittwirkung. See, e.g., K. Hesse,
Grundz1ige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 139-43 (14th
ed.,1984). Because constitutional provisions now embrace principles for the ordering
of social life, one even encounters views that private law is necessary mainly as ap-
plied constitutional law. If one could derive precise guidelines for the resolution of
inter-personal controversies from theoretically applicable constitutional texts, pri-
vate law legislation would not be necessary. See Alexy, supra n.20 at 491-92.
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of the state in society is comparatively modest. Yet, the agenda of
government has greatly expanded since the New Deal and the sub-
sequent war effort: numerous regulatory schemes and social pro-
grams are now in place and have resisted attempts to roll them
back. Has this expansion of government affected American constitu-
tionalism in the way suggested by the example of more resolute wel-
fare states?
Although some differences could be expected from the paucity
and hesitancy of steps that have been made in the direction of a
more interventionist government, let me focus here on differences
related to the fact that the apparatus of government survived the
challenges of the New Deal essentially intact.22 It is the durability
of a structure of independent power centers designed to contain the
government that plays no small part in explaining the peculiar role
that the judiciary has assumed in contemporary America. Consider
that the United States has no unified executive, supported by a par-
liamentary majority, capable of managing national affairs in the
manner of a typical European Cabinet. The legislatures, state and
federal, are su.bject to so many internal fragmentations of power
that they are seldom capable of coming up in timely fashion with
clear formulations of policY or definition.s of values required by an
activist government. The judiciary, however, with its blend of legis-
lative and managerial powers, always remains available as a propul-
sive force. It is therefore scarcely surprising that in the activist
Zeitgeist of thE~ sixties the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided to make use of the judiciary's "activist" potential and employ
constitutional litigation in the service of prodding government into
various forms of positive action. Soon various reform-minded
groups, frustrated by stalemates in other branches of government,
began taking advantage of the decentralized process of raising con-
stitutional issuEls, and provided activist courts with the necessary liti-
gational impulses. And, as is normal in the radically decentralized
judicial system,. a prominent role came to be played not only by the
Supreme Court, but also by individual trial judges. In the golden
age of this activism, during the years of the Warren Court, federal
trial judges become initiators and sometimes also implementors of a
22. Significant shifts occurred in the relations between federal and state govern-
ments, with the federal government assuming a much larger role. At the center, ad-
ministrative agencies were created, some of them :independent from the executive,
and the powers of the President were enlarged.
One of the most important examples of mild interventionism, (left outside the
scope of this essay), is the refusal of the American government to follow most other
welfare states and nationalize important social services. These services remained in
private hands, but were subject to regulation. As a result, many issues that are else-
where an internal administrative matter, remain in America a subject of potential
litigation between private industry and public agendes.
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variety of programs, such as educational, prison, and mental hospital
reforms. They also pioneered changes in the treatment of various
minorities and even attempted to create a guaranteed income.23
This remarkable efflorescence of judicial activism may have pro-
duced a negative feed-back effect on other political institutions: pol-
iticians discovered that judicial initiatives could provide them with
an excuse not to grasp the nettle of public policy issues on which
their constituents expressed strong but conflicting feelings. As a re-
sult, the rQle of legislation to shape clear governmental policy
schemes may have been further reduced.24
Although the sampling of the heady wine of judicial activism
has more recently subsided, American judges still perform tasks
which seem to most outsiders to belong to the sphere of other
branches of government.25 The question is still topical: how can all
this effort take place in the context of constitutional litigation? ,
What should be remembered at this point is that judges have
the authority not only to determine what the Constitution man-
dates, but also traditional powers to coerce officials to undertake
specific actions under threat of finding them in contempt of court.
What was needed to enable judges more resolutely to shape social
policy was only to transform traditional litigation from an instru-
ment for resolving narrow inter-personal disputes into a device for
the formulation and implementation of policy, usually in the context
of suing individual governmental officials.
This transformation indeed took place, but can here only be
silhouetted in broadest outline.26 Early on, standing requirements
(legitimatio ad litem) were relaxed to enable "ideological plaintiffs"
to initiate action without proving tangible injury, or, in the injunc-
tive setting, the threat of impending tangible injury: an injury to
the plaintiffs' moral sense of right was often found sufficient. Espe-
23. How courts tried to create a guaranteed income is discu~sed interestingly in
Krislow, "The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize the Right to Welfare" 58
Minn.L.Rev. 211 (1973).
24. In the period when judicial review begun to undergo a transformation, a
noted American legal scholar expressed his concern that legislative responsibility
may be weakened in the wake of this transformation. See J.A. Thayer, "The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129, ;155-
56 (1893). It is worth noting that legislative inactivity can manifest itself not only in
the failure to enact new statutes, but also in the failure to repeal antiquated ones.
25. Especially striking to foreigners is that bold activist roles are assumed by
trial judges, some of which appear uninhibited as fauns in Debussy's afternoon.
Even those observers who are basically in sympathy with judicial activism, find that
a warning against activist excesses is warranted in the case of the United States.
See, e.g., M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Compamtive Perspective 47(1989).
26. For a sympathetic account of this development, see A. Chayes, "The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation" 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1281 (1976). For a more skepti-
cal view, see A. Cox, "The Effect of the Search for Equality Upon Judicial Institu-
tions" 1979 Wash. Un.L.Rev. 795-816; P. Schuck, supm n.14, at 150-69.
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cially useful in springing the bounds of traditional litigation was the
consolidation of roughly similar claims of large groups into "class ac-
tions", without the need of actual plaintiffs to identify more than a
few members of the group, or prove that the remainder of the group
is willing to seek a particular redress. Through this device, the door
of the lawsuit came wide open to various public-spirited interveners
to express their views and provide an informational base similar to
one provided by hearings before legislative committees. If needed,
judges could inform themselves informally on what came to be
openly called "legIslative" facts.27 How this transmogrified litigation
released the legislative and managerial potential of trial judges, dor-
mant in their traditional concentrated authority, can best be exem-
plified by returning to the earlier illustration of an injunction to
force school officials to admit a minority child to a school. If a single
child is involved, such litigation can hardly become a vehicle for re-
forming the school system in a particular area. But where injunc-
tive relief is sought on behalf of all minority children in a district,
the ensuing litigation readily provides the judge with an opportunity
to do so. Reorganization plans of sorts must now be developed and
compliance with them monitored. In this situation the initial judi-
cial decree can hardly express more than the readiness of the judge
to bring the functioning of the school system into harmony with
constitutional demands for equal protection. A series of flexible
supplemental decrees, all backed by judicial contempt powers, then
spell out details of the reorganization pltm (law-making component)
or issue specific orders on what should be done (managerial compo-
nent). Persons not involved in the original injunctive suit may be
drawn into its vortex by becoming subjects of so-called "anti-ob-
struction" injunctions. Sometimes judges would even order officials
in other branches of government to provide resources needed for the
reorganization, although this order belongs to those in the arsenal of
judicial power whose constitutional status is far from clear.28 Obvi-
ously, then, constitutional litigation so transformed can become an
effective instrument for generating affirmative governmental action.
27. Observe that facts thrown ·up by conventional litigation seldom provide the
vista required for successful regulation: cases do not present themselves in a fashion
sufficiently representative so as to permit reliable guesses about the universe of pos-
sible problems which a regulative scheme purports to cover. As presented by the lit-
igants, facts often do not embrace what is central or typical to a sphere one intends
to regulate, leading to undesirable slants. For some problems that arise in attempts
to legislate in a litigational context, see M. Damaska, "On Circumstances Favoring
Codification" 52 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 355, 357-58
(1983).
28. For a compendium of cases in which judg:es ordered expenditure of funds,
see G.E. Frug, "The Judicial Power of the Purse" 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 715, 718-32 (1978).
On the uncertainties surrounding the limits of judicial powers to order the so-called
"structural relief", see R.F. Nagel, supra n. 5, p.61; P. Shuck, supra n.14, p.153.
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But how can this action find support in an eighteenth century
Constitution whose basic inspiration was one of containing, rather
than triggering governmental intervention? As already suggested,
judges began to construe broad constitutional provisions in novel
ways so as to achieve goals associated with modern governmental
objectives. What a pronouncedly activist constitution would man-
date directly, judges would struggle to achieve in circuitous ways.
As an example, consider the characteristic use of the equal pro-
tection clause of the 14th Amendment to provide services to the dis-
advantaged, and to mold social relations in ways judges deem
required by the Constitution. Courts do not openly proclaim that
the government should provide a service, or a service of a specified
quality, to a particular disadvantaged group. Instead, they seize upon
the absence of symmetry in the position of the disadvantaged and
the rest of society, and demand that the asymmetry be eliffiinated.
If the service is to be provided at all, it should, they say, be extended
on equal protection grounds to include the disadvantaged. Since the
total withdrawal of the service, or its general downgrading, is often
not politically feasible, the actual effect of the court's order is tanta-
mount to demanding extension or improvement of a service or bene-
fit. The Supreme Court's decision signalling the end of the dual
education system (Brown v. Board of Education) is a good illustra-
tion: the Court did-not hold that states are constitutionally required
to maintain a public education system, but demanded that, if they
do, the system should be the same for students of all races.
This use of the equal protection clause, with the anti-discrimina-
tion idea inherent in it, carries a tremendous potential for urging the
government to reduce various disadvantages flowing from economic
and other circumstances, or to propagate new forms of social con-
sciousness. It can also be used to extend the reach of criminal
prohibitions.29 Yet, as can be expected in a polity that continues to
be ambivalent about the use of governmental power, this potential
has been tapped seldom and very selectively. Traditional common
law techniques proved particularly useful to confine sporadic deci-
sions to narrow contexts, weakening their gravitational pull and
their capacity to expand to new areas by analogical reasoning.
The same is true for other constitutional provisions that are
used by courts to achieve goals usually associated with objectives of
29. An example of bizarre extremity is the decision of the highest court of New
York State in People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984). Here the Court pronounced
the state's rape statute punishing male aggression toward women as contrary to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Anticipating, however, that the response
of the legislator would not be the abolition of the crime of rape altogether, the Court
sua sponte extended the rape statute to encompass sexual aggression by women on
men.
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the modern wE!lfare state.30 A single example should suffice. Until
the era of the New Deal, the 6th Amendment right to counsel in
criminal cases was isolated from the question of whether the defend-
ant can actually afford legal assistance. The Amendment has since
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to embrace an affirmative
duty of the state to provide legal service to impecunious defendants.
However, this position was never expanded into a broad principle re-
quiring the government to supply material conditions for the exer-
cise of recognized constitutional rights. It was not even extended to
civil litigation, on the pattern of "judicare" arrangements adopted by
most modern welfare states.31
Outside of the narrow area of racial discrimination, where the
13th Amendment provides a historical precedent, American courts
are very reluctant to recognize that constitutional rights can radiate
"horizontally", i.e., in relations among citizens, rather than only
"vertically", i.e., as a protection of the individual against state ac-
tion.32 Nevertheless, a body of decisional law developed since the
New Deal greatly attenuated the link to state action in some areas.
And, while even here the link to state action has not been totally
eviscerated, it is only through legal legerdemain that one can still in-
sist that constitutional rights do not "radiate" into the private
sphere. For example, essentially private conduct can now become
linked to government action by the mere fact that it takes place on
land leased from the government.33 In many areas, however, the
state action requirement continues to exert a strong limiting effect
on the capacity of litigants to coerce government into positive action,
or to require the compensatory payment of damages.34
30. For an interesting discussion of this problem see D. P. Currie, "Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights" 53 U,Chicago L.Rev. 864, 872-86 (1986). See also S.
A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery; New Meaning for the Tenth Amend-
ment, in, 1976 Supreme Court Review, ed. P.B. Kurland, pp. 169-73 (1977).
31. On the refusal of American courts to recognize civil litigants' constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel, see R. Schlesinger, H. Baade, M. Damaska, P.
Herzog, Comparati've Law 361, n. 41c (5th ed. 1988). This is not to say that many
American courts have no power to appoint counsel for an indigent party. See 69
ALR Fed. 666 (1984). A comparativist should not fail to recognize here that Ameri-
can procedure is extremely costly, so that subsidizing litigation presents a more seri-
ous problem here than in most other countries.
32. For a potentially dramatic inroad on state action requirement see Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But see Moose Lodge No.107 v.I'MJis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
33. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct 3040 (1989) abortions which were pri-
vate in every other respect were treated as linked to the state because the hospitals
where they were performed were situated on land leased from the state.
34. It should also be emphasized that some recent Supreme Court decisions, as
well as decisions of lower federal courts, strongly suggest that many constitutional
clauses will continue to be interpreted as limitations on the state's power to act, not
as guarantees of certain minimal levels of safety and security. See, e.g., DeShaney v.
Winnebago County, 109 S.Ct 998 (1989), for the interpretation of the due process
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While the judicial branch has been thus instrumental in intro-
ducing fragments of welfare state arrangements into contemporary
America, it would be a mistake to think that the forceful judicial po-
licing of the Constitution was limited only to those spheres that can
readily be associated with the ideology of governmental intervention
in social life. Throughout the period of unabashed judicial activism,
the Supreme Court continued to render decisions affirming individ-
ual freedom from intrusion in purlieus of private life, even if sup-
port for some of these decisions required the justices to seek
illumination in the deep shadows of the constitutional text35, and
even if some of these decisions implied the invalidation of legislative
enactments of long standing. Prominent examples are a long series
of decisions expanding procedural rights of criminal defendants, sev-
eral decisions establishing an individual's right to control his or her
role in procreation36, as well as decisions protecting various forms of
freedom of expression even when it entails behavior deeply dis-
turbing to prevailing sensibilities37• As with other branches of
American government, so with the courts: judges remain torn be-
tween impulses to contain and to release governmental action, hold-
ing together warring demands which these impulses generate in a
sometimes dazzlingly precarious balance.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The peculiar American constitutional arrangements, especially
the system of widely distributed authority, may possess a measure of
seductive charm to all those who have experienced totalitarian gov-
ernment. But the very centrality of the Constitution in the life of
the nation and the prominence of courts as its custodians also make
some challenges to modern constitutionalism quite serious and prob-
ably more visible than elsewhere. Two challenges deserve brief
mention in these concluding observations.
The first challenge is native to America and concerns the effi-
ciency of polycentric norm creation, with its overlaps and uncertain-
ties, to which the traditional constitutional arrangements give rise.
clause of the 14th Amendment. See, also Jackson v. City ofJuliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 103
(7th Cir. 1983).
35. Here the right to privacy was discovered. For a discussion of the judicial ex-
ploration of penumbral constitutional "emanations", see L.Tribe, supra n. 15, p. 774
ff.
36. See, e.g., Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S.479(1965), holding that a couple
could not be criminally convicted for using birth control, and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), establishing that the state cannot criminalize abortion before viability.
The later decision has been lately somewhat eviscerated by the decision Webster
v.Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040(1989).
37. See Johnson v.Texas, 109 S.Ct 2533 (1989), holding that the state cannot
criminalize the burning of the national flag as a form of political protest.
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As indicated before, the legislative procE~ss is so replete with obsta-
cles to the timely formulation of clear and coherent social policy
that legislative schemes provide relatively little grammar to social
life, putting pressures on the judicial branch that simply do not exist
in other countries. But imperfectly hierarchical courts, with judges
exercising power in strongly personal ways, may be institutionally
inadequate to provide clear solutions to more and more problems
that surface in a rapidly changing and litigious society. Is it not pos-
sible that the traditional apparatus of governance and the changing
functions of the modern state are in discord? Many New Dealers
thought so, but their reforms did not weaken the system of checks
and balances.38 At present, the question receives relatively scant at-
tention by lawyers, and those who address it are frequently guided
by the old flow of sympathies for the inherited system of frag-
mented powers.39 Some of them question the need for encompassing
policy schemes as an illusion of the Englightenment's terrible aim-
plificateurs: human affairs may be systematically unpredictable,
even mysterious, so that small prudential steps and compromises to
which fragmented powers lead may be the best approach there is.4o
Others believe that governmental gridlocks force society to seek so-
lutions outside the state apparatus, and that this by-passing of gov-
ernmental structures is all for the best, a harbinger of the future.41
The second challenge is to the legitimacy of judicial review.
Generalities of constitutional concepts inevitably open constitutional
discourse to controversial issues of ethical and political philosophy,
bringing the formal element in the law to its lowest ebb. The
boundary between the legal and political, always elusive, is here
most difficult to ascertain and to maintain. What is to prevent
judges from discovering in the abstractions of constitutional lan-
38. The thrust of their efforts was to create independent administrative agencies
of the federal government as propulsive instruments of government. The influential
expositor of this view was James Landis. See J.M. Landis, The Administrative Pro-
cess (1938).
39. For a recent panegyric to checks and balances see C. R. Sunstein, "Constitu-
tionalism Mter thl~ New Deal" 101 Harv.L.Rev. 421, 489-90 (1987). Cft. J.L. Sunquist,
Constitutional Reform and Efficient Government (1986).
40. See, e.g., A. Kronman, "Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence" 94 Yale
L.J. 1567,1588-90,11)02,1611 (1985). The preference for prudence and common sense
over broad philosophical designs is not infrequently associated by foreign observers
with the prevailinl~ currents of American constitutionalism. See, e.g., J. Habermas,
Naturrecht und Rt~volution, essay in Theorie und Praxis 92 (1978). ("Der Beruj'ung
aufPhilosophie entspricht in Amerika die Beruj'ung auf den Common sense").
41. The by-passing of official structures is perhaps best exemplified in the proce-
dural domain, where various forms of settlement tend to replace official mechanisms
for the administration of justice. Interestingly enough, the movement away from
state controlled forms is viewed with approval both by some believers in the powers
of the market and by some advocates of a return to small communities expected to
share a nomos and moral commitments.
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guage, as in some species of abstract art, whatever they bring with
them to the task of resolving constitutional questions?
In American constitutional practice, it is not widely held that
the Founding document contains an immanent and guiding scheme
of values whose application to constitutional questions could gener-
ate constraints. As with ordinary legislation, so with the Constitu-
tion: the political process is perceived as incapable of producing
coherent outcomes, leading instead to an omnium gatherum of deals
and compromises.42 The view that the Constitution is a charter of
principles is also contrary to the heritage of judge-made law with its
innate skepticism of the search for widely encompassing schemes.
Case-law doctrines, of course, could be a more serious factor con-
straining discretion, but their elegantly chaotic laxities reduce their
stabilizing potential. As can be expected in a legal culture where
paradigmatic law is judge-made, so that norm-creation and norm-ap-
plication cannot be separated~ the idea that judges apply pre-existing
law is repudiated as a myth more successfully than elsewhere. How-
ever, because the image of a judge applying the law may not only be
a myth but may also be an aspiration, if human beings are motivated
by aspirations, another constraining force on judicial behavior has
been discredited. In this environment, the view is gaining ground
that deciding constitutional issues is a matter of formally uncon-
strained political choice. If this is indeed the case, why should the
judiciary be authorized to frustrate the political will expressed by
more representative political institutions. especially in the federal
system where judges are appointed for life?
The further spreading of this view may usher in a legitimacy
crisis more widespread and serious in America than in other consti-
tutional systems. Not only is the Constitution more pivotal to the
life of the Nation than elsewhere, and the judges more powerful and
less inhibited than in other countries, but also the authority to de-
cide constitutional questions is allotted to all judges rather than to a
specialized quasi-legislative tribunal.43 The crisis, if it develops,
42. If the Constitution contained a deep structure of harmonious principles, a
constitutional amendment could be unconstitutional. In countries where the tradi-
tion of philosophical amplitude is stronger, this view is sometimes openly expressed
by judges, but it is difficult to imagine the U.S. Supreme Court endorsing the same
idea. See L. Tribe, supra n. 15, p. 102. Some American scholars have nevertheless
suggested that the multitude of conceptions that mingle in the "charter" are absorb-
able into a coherent system. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 176-90, 379 (1986);
W. Murphy, "An Ordering of Constitutional Values" 53 S.Cal.L.Rev. 703, 744 ff
(1980).
43. That constitutional courts are akin to a super-legislature is a widespread
opinion in Europe, shared by such luminaries as Kelsen in Austria and Calamandrei
in Italy. See J. Esser, Vorverstiindnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung 201
(1970); J.C. Balat, La Nature Juridique de Controle de Constitutionalite des Lois 79-
80 (1982).
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could thus not be contained to a segment of the judicial branch and
prevented from spreading to areas where the function of justice is to
defuse the political. There is, accordingly, an ever- present risk in-
herent in the American propensity, registered already by de Toc-
queville, to convert all social issues, including those of high politics,
into legal ones, and to entrust their resolution to the judges. Like an
egg-eating snake, law cannot swallow politics without altering its
shape: if politi(~s are legalized, law becomes politicized. It is then no
wonder that so much contemporary American constitutional theo-
rizing is largely a pilgrimage to the problem of how constitutional
decisionmaking can be structured in the absence of conventional for-
mal constraints.44
44. Some scholars try to develop constraints by proposing a form of rational dis-
course within an ideal communication community. See, e.g., F.I. Michelman, "Traces
of Self-government" 100 Harv.L.Rev 4, 74-76 (1986). For another variant of this ap-
proach, see B.A. Ackerman, "Why Dialogue," 86 Journal of Philosophy 5 (1989).
Others, follOwing the American philosopher John Rawls, consider constitutional
problems from the standpoint of a person under the veil of ignorance as to his or her
position in the proposed constitutional arrangement, attempting by this device to
convert questions of inter-personal into questions of intra-personal choice. They
then use tools derived from welfare economics in grappling with constitutional di-
lemmas.
No matter how interesting this theoreticallitl~raturemay be, it remains silent
on the subject of the resolution of disagreements or doubts that survive the struc-
tured dialogue or a single p~rson's reasoning behind the veil of ignorance. The
problems of political constraint and the authority of the state are thus largely ig-
nored. See P. Kah.n, "Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory", 99 Yale
LJ. 1 (1989). To the extent that the inspiration foJ' the construct of ideal communi-
cation community is the German Diskurstheorie, this omission is hardly surprising:
Diskurstheorie associates discourse and consensus; it actually represents a model of
truth discovery. SE!e J. Habermas, "Wahrheistheorien" in Wirklichkeit und RejZex-
ion; Walter Schultz zum 60. Geburtstag, 211 ff.(1973).
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